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SUMMARY
Informal markets receive little attention from governments and researchers, despite their centrality to
farmers’ seed security. This paper documents the importance of informal markets for supplying seed and
restocking critical plant genetic resources in normal and stress periods. It analyses farmers’ rationales
for using such markets and their strategic actions in selecting out seed from grain. Conceptual aids for
differentiating among market goods – grain, ‘implicit seed’ and seed – are presented, including tracing of
agro-ecological seed sources, traders’ seed management behaviour and seed/grain price patterns. Ethiopian
case material gives rare insight into how different scales of traders manage the seed/grain divide. Better
understanding of informal markets is an important precursor to strengthening them as such markets have
unrealized potential to deliver more and higher quality seed, and a greater range of modern and local
varieties. Support for informal seed markets could usefully feature in rural livelihood and social protection
programmes, but this will require basic shifts in interventions and further refinements in market analysis.
I N T RO D U C T I O N
Seed is the basic agricultural input, and access to preferred and adapted seed is
a prerequisite for sustainable production. Formal seed systems produce and diffuse
modern varieties and certified seed, but there is growing research and policy interest
in informal seed systems, as informal channels provide 80–90% of the materials
farmers sow in their fields worldwide (Cooper, 1993). However, while self-provisioning
and exchange networks are increasingly studied (e.g. Aw-Hassan et al., 2008; Badstue
et al., 2006), there is still little explicit attention paid to informal markets as venues for
acquiring and selling seed (Lipper et al., 2009). The role in seed security of the many
decentralized, often open markets, where farmers obtain food and basic supplies
(e.g. sugar, matches) remains poorly understood and presents a serious gap to our
understanding of the current mechanisms supporting small farmers’ livelihoods.
There are several reasons why informal markets have been obscured when thinking
about farmers’ seed provision options. Popular conceptions often idealize the notion
of self-sufficiency, consequently over-emphasizing the importance of home supply for
seed security and portraying the use of off-farm channels as a sign of vulnerability (as
seen in Cromwell, 1996). The formal seed sector is also reluctant to recognize seed
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obtained from local channels, including markets, as representing ‘seed’ at all. Alongside
these stereotypes, study of local seed markets faces practical challenges stemming from
the special nature of seed in local markets: it is not labelled, and material purchased as
‘seed’ may later be used as ‘food’ (or vice-versa). Appropriate concepts and methods
are needed to identify seed transactions, and to understand better the decisions and
actions of both farmers and traders before the importance of informal markets can be
appreciated.
This paper takes significant steps toward filling the gap on informal seed market
analysis. It draws from the available literature to highlight situations where informal
markets are especially important for seed security (particularly in Africa). Building
on this cross-site review, it analyses farmers’ rationales for using informal markets,
and their strategic actions in selecting seed out from grain. The paper also introduces
some conceptual aids for analysing informal seed markets, and applies these to data on
traders in eastern Ethiopia. Analysis of farmers’ and traders’ practices helps illuminate
where and why these markets are used and complements more output-focused studies
of market function (e.g. Lipper et al., 2009). Better understanding of informal markets
is an important precursor to strengthening them, as they have unrealized potential
to deliver more, and higher quality, seed, and a greater range of modern and local
varieties. Conclusions suggest ways to support informal seed markets, conceptually
and in practice.
T H E I M P O RTA N C E O F I N F O R M A L S E E D M A R K E T U S E
In much of the world, informal markets are important sources of seed for small farmers,
for most food crops except maize and vegetable seed. Field accounts highlight diverse
trends in market use.
Informal markets can be the major source of farmers’ seed for key crops
The case of groundnut in dryland zones of Mali shows that local markets can
be farmers’ prime source for seed. In the Douentza Circle area, groundnuts are
difficult to store: moulds build up easily and, if not well-dried, stocks lose germination
capacity with the escalating heat. Groundnuts are easily saleable (so are sold when
specific needs arise) and the few common varieties sown are widely found in the market
(E. Weltzien, personal communication, November 2007). For all these reasons, farmers
let traders assume the challenge of keeping stocks, and farmers purchase a large portion
of their groundnut supply every season. In this region of northern Mali, farmers’ own
production provides the vast bulk of seed (≥80%) for all major crops (sorghum, pearl
millet, sesame, okra), except for groundnut and cowpea seed – where local markets
dominate supply (CRS and Partners, 2006).
Market use for seed varies by client wealth group
Market use for seed proves to be particularly important for poorer farmers.
Fieldwork from Rwanda (CIAT, 1991) indicates that almost half the poor buy 90%
of their bean seed during the main growing season, while only 6% of relatively ‘rich’
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Table 1. Proportion (%) of bean farmers using major seed channels in
Burundi in 1992, by wealth class and season.
% Using own harvest % Using market
Wealth class Season A Season B Season A Season B
Poor 55 34 51 80
Medium 81 73 22 52
Rich 100 85 4 32
Modified from Sperling (1994).
farmers use the market at all. The difference is not just quantitative, but also qualitative:
poorer farmers use markets because they have to; richer farmers because they want to,
i.e. to seek out new varieties. Bean source data for consecutive seasons in Burundi show
similar wealth-related trends (Table 1). Other studies document increased market use
by poorer farmers for bean seed in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi and
Uganda (David and Sperling, 1999), and for sorghum seed in Ethiopia (McGuire,
2008).
Markets prove critical for supplying seed in crisis periods
Somewhat surprisingly, informal grain markets prove key for seed security across
periods of instability, including drought, flood and, even, civil strife. With the decline
in home stocks (from stores or harvests) comes a concomitant rise in use of markets
for seed. This is especially so for crops whose seed is regularly obtained from grain
stocks, such as rice, beans or maize. In different types of crises, analyses show that 20–
50% of seed sown has been obtained from informal markets. In fact, the few studies
that assess both seed supplied from relief aid and seed obtained from markets suggest
the latter is more important to farmers in stress periods (Figure 1). Markets offer
farmers flexibility to choose crops and varieties in response to immediate, and possibly
changing, production and economic conditions (McGuire and Sperling, 2008).
Specialized seed markets provide key plant genetic resources and function
within localized production systems
The existence of seed villages suggests the phenomenon of specialized seed markets
within local production systems. In northern Mali, a cluster of villages is renowned
for producing an early maturing pearl millet variety needed for the more arid areas of
Douentza Circle. While these villages help maintain seed security (and plant genetic
resource security) for parts of the Circle in normal times, their role becomes critical
in crisis periods. Following consecutive stresses in 2003–05 (drought, locust attack,
flood), farmers streamed in from regions such as Timbuktu, Goassi, Gao, and from
Burkina Faso, to buy millet seed, which then sold for up to 25 000 CFA francs/100 kg,
10 000 more than normal (1US$ ≈ 450CFA francs). Pearl millet dominates production
and farmers prefer to grow their own varieties, as the range of adaptation is narrow
because of flowering date, local rainfall patterns and differences in soil types (CRS and
Partners, 2006). So seed security in this stressed region depends on finding the right
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Figure 1. Seed sources used following a crisis in selected sub-Saharan African countries, showing proportion of all
seed sown of specified crop coming from emergency aid and from local markets. ∗: seed sown in 1995 and ∗∗ 1996
(Sperling, 1997); ¶: 1997 (Sperling, 2002); †: 2000, combining Deyr and Gu seasons (Longley et al., 2001); §: many
seasons, for West Hararghe Zone, calculated from Sperling et al. (2007).
seed, the right plant genetic resource material – and specialized local seed production
centres are recognized.
The point of this review is not to posit that local markets are superior to other
seed channels. Rather it emphasizes that: a) informal seed/grain markets are a supply
force that merits attention more generally, and b) for those interested in vulnerable
populations (e.g. the poor or during crises), informal markets merit intensive analysis.
R E A S O N S W H Y FA R M E R S U S E M A R K E T S F O R S E E D
The previous section established the significance of informal seed/grain markets in
providing seed to farmers, but what is the rationale for their use? It is often assumed
that farmers use informal markets as a last resort, after exhausting other options
(of home stocks, bartering with neighbours, sometimes formal channels). Available
evidence reveals a more complex set of reasons, including proactive and reactive
factors. Further, these causal factors may occur at a single point in time, but also may
drive longer-term trends towards using local markets to obtain seed. The evidence
below summarizes reasons for farmer seed market use, grouped by motive and time
frame.
Single point in time – reactive
Farmers may seek seed from the market in response to a short-term crisis that
reduces or eliminates their on-farm seed stocks. Poor yields may cause some farmers
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to set aside little or none of the harvest for seed, prioritizing consumption or sale. Seed
stocks can also be depleted or spoiled due to pest predation, disease, theft or other
disasters (e.g. fire, water intrusion in storage sites). Even where farmers have their
own stocks, germination may fail because of variable rainfall or poor soil quality, or
seedlings lost to grazing animals or disease. In the above examples, markets may be
used to fill an immediate gap in seed supply, often caused by acute stresses (McGuire,
2007; Sperling, 1994). Equally, when acute needs for cash arise, such as with illness,
all home stocks may be sold.
Single point in time – proactive
There is increasing realization that farmers also use informal markets to respond to
positive opportunities, as a way to obtain novel varieties. For instance, farmers in East
Africa will complement their own portfolios of pigeonpea varieties by purchasing small
amounts of new varieties which traders, or other farmers, put on offer (Sperling et al.,
1996). Informal markets may also be used because they provide services in addition
to seed, such as credit. Some farmers prefer informal markets to borrowing seed from
neighbours, as they wish to avoid arduous transaction costs, or stigma, associated with
requesting seed (e.g. David and Sperling, 1999; McGuire, 2008).
Trend over time – reactive
The above factors generally reflect idiosyncratic events affecting individuals. There
is also evidence to suggest trends towards increased market use for acquiring seed.
Supply from other sources (neighbours or kin) is in decline, for varied reasons. First, in
many sites, recurrent stress is eroding the capacity of farmers to supply seed to others,
and often a small number of farmers are identified as ‘key seed suppliers’ by their
neighbours (McGuire, 2008). Second, seed exchange between households depends on
the social ties between them (Badstue et al., 2006) and social networks that underpin
this exchange appear to be in decline due to factors such as commercialization,
labour migration, livelihood diversification and even prolonged conflict (Bellon, 2004;
Sperling, 1997). The trend to greater market use may also result from chronic poverty,
whereby more farmers need to procure larger amounts of seed, off-farm and more
regularly (Dalton et al., 2010).
Trend over time – proactive
Finally, some trends are leading to more routine, proactive use of markets. For seed
of crops difficult to store (e.g. groundnuts in northern Mali, discussed above) or of
high-value crops that are vulnerable to theft, farmers sometimes prefer to obtain seed
from merchants. This effectively transfers risk to merchants, who may have better and
more secure storage facilities. Also, where crops have to meet specific standards for
quality or uniformity in output markets, farmers may purchase higher-quality seed
from discriminating merchants or farmers’ unions to help their production attain
quality standards, as in the case of beans destined for export in Ethiopia (Rubyogo
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et al., forthcoming). In both these examples, merchants perform specialized functions
for farmers, conserving seed, absorbing risk or meeting quality standards.
These reasons are not exhaustive, but illustrate the need to move away from viewing
informal markets always as the seed source of ‘last resort’, whose use exposes farmers
to unacceptable risks and indicates desperation (for examples, see FEWS Net, 2009;
Ndjeunga, 2002; Republic of Kenya, 2005). The notion that farmers who use markets
do so ‘without constructive cause’ is simplistic (and patronizing). Farmers may source
seed from informal markets for ‘positive’ (proactive) or ‘negative’ (reactive) reasons,
and markets can provide opportunities or serve as a safety net. These drivers function
both in the immediate and longer term. Whatever the underlying reason for using
informal markets, farmers are responding strategically to specific circumstances.
S T R AT E G I C A C T I O N S I N L O C A L M A R K E T S : G R A I N, I M P L I C I T S E E D A N D S E E D
We now turn to look at actual seed market functioning. This is no easy task as there
are few institutional boundaries for delineating a seed from a food market. Even the
material itself can transform from to seed to food, or sometimes vice-versa, depending
on its specific qualities and time of the year. To help analyse local market functioning,
we introduce the term ‘implicit seed’. Much that is sold in local markets is used for
grain (for consumption, for livestock feed, for brewing). However, there is a special
subset of this grain which can implicitly also be used for seed. Only rarely do local
market traders sell seed outright, that is, a product destined only for sowing (e.g. material
treated for storage which cannot be consumed).
Below, we suggest several ways in which farmers (buyers) and traders (sellers)
distinguish between seed (that is, implicit seed) and grain, and how they then manage
stocks accordingly. Providing seed from markets involves a series of strategic actions
from farmers and traders alike.
How farmers select and manage seed
Farmers exercise agency in using informal markets, that is, they act consciously
and strategically to maximize benefit and limit their exposure to risks. As with formal
sector seed purchases, farmers selecting seed consider aspects of both variety quality
(genetic attributes, such as plant type, growth cycle, seed colour) and seed quality
(physical, physiological and sanitary attributes, such as the germination rate, and
the absence/presence of disease, and stones). To obtain a good product, farmers
assess the attributes of the product as well as of its provider.
Farmers’ use of product attributes may include seeking particular named varieties
with known traits and adaptation, or relying on colour, shape and size characteristics
to identify grain types with which they have had prior good experience. Farmers also
indirectly assess storage conditions, looking for insect damage or discarding batches
that have a musty smell. In some cases, farmers further sort their purchases prior to
sowing, just as they would with their own production. This sorting removes damaged,
broken or other obviously non-viable or inert material (David and Sperling, 1999). In
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this way, the amount of seed they actually plant will be less than the ‘implicit seed’
they purchase.
Of course, it is not always possible to ‘see’ seed quality, so farmers also assess
attributes of the provider. Buyers may choose farmer-sellers known for producing good
seed or merchants from whom they have previously bought high-quality materials.
In the absence of formal regulation, social certification within a community can be a
powerful tool. Those shown to have delivered poor-quality seed risk losing clients (and
their neighbours and relatives) not only in the short term, but also in the longer term,
and for grain as well as seed (T. Remington, personal communication, May 2006).
This social certification contrasts with the better-known formal certification, put forward
as a guarantee by commercial companies selling packaged products. In practice, such
formal certification is of little direct value to farmers purchasing sub-standard seed.
Formal enforcement lies within a complicated web of expensive and often far-removed
regulators.
What the above evidence suggests is that seed and grain are both sold within
informal markets. To reiterate the broad processes: 1) When grain is on offer, it may
or may not also be useful as seed: it has to be adapted and show farmer-acceptable
qualities. 2) In scouting out implicit seed, farmers seek out specific varieties, usually
from sellers they know, to increase the chances that the material purchased will produce
on their own farms. They also screen for visible quality traits. 3) Farmers often buy
implicit seed (maybe within a larger grain batch) and make the refinements for ‘seed’
at home, sorting out the non-seed trash (inert matter and damaged seed). Hence, in
informal markets, grain and implicit seed may be sold side-by-side.
How traders select and manage seed
Traders and informal markets have also long responded to the grain, implicit seed
and, even, seed categories. They shape practices in several areas, including agro-
ecological provenance, seed management per se and pricing, all presented briefly
below.
Agro-ecological zones of acquisition reflecting seed/grain differences. Traders who understand
agriculture and anticipate their customers’ needs recognize that certain agro-
ecological zones can provide implicit planting material and others not. The potential
for provision differs markedly by crop, and whether the varieties on offer are broadly
or narrowly adapted. Knowledge of the agro-ecology of the source is one important
factor when farmers consider whether to buy material which comes from afar. Traders
also have to factor in agro-ecological provenance when acquiring stocks which they
hope to sell as seed.
To illustrate the principle of source agro-ecology as a market indicator for identifying
implicit seed, Figure 2 presents an example from a drought-prone area in eastern
Ethiopia. West Hararghe has considerable agro-ecological variation, and adaptation
is a serious concern; the main crops (sorghum, maize, beans) have quite distinct
potential zones for acquiring seed. As Figure 2 shows, sorghum seed is best acquired
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Figure 2. Different scales of adaptation for seed in West Hararghe Zone, Ethiopia. Sorghum varieties have narrow
adaptation, and its seed generally has very local provenance (ellipse A), maize seed can be sourced from further afield
(ellipse B); improved bean varieties are widely adapted, with seed obtained from large producers far away (ellipse C).
locally (within 10 km), while beans, for instance, can be obtained from zones much
further afield (e.g. from the Central Rift Valley, >150 km away).
Trader seed management behaviour. Traders can also give clear signals that they offer
implicit seed, as opposed to grain alone, through their management behaviour. While
provenance represents one key management decision, mostly affecting the ‘variety
quality’ of implicit seed, much of traders’ management concentrates on post-harvest
actions which mainly affect ‘seed quality’ per se. Examples, drawn again from West
Hararghe, list some of the seed-related management attributes mentioned by traders
(i.e. what they consider as ‘good practices’) which may guide their management of
seed supply (Table 2).
Seed and grain price differences. Informal markets also reflect grain, implicit seed and
seed categories by manifesting price differences. During non-sowing periods, grain,
implicit seed and seed remain relatively undistinguished in terms of price. However,
during sowing periods, extending some 4–8 weeks prior to planting, two trends can
be observed. First, prices spike for the most sought-after varieties for sowing, that is,
for the plant genetic materials that are most adapted, productive or which give the
highest income return (i.e. those which could be used as implicit seed). In areas of high
stress, where few varieties may perform at all, prices between desired and non-desired
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Table 2. How traders potentially distinguish between seed and grain (from West Hararghe, eastern
Ethiopia).
Issues of variety quality
• Variety type: specific varieties sometimes sought by traders (modern varieties or when for
export). Also, varieties should be rigorously clustered by adaptation zones (e.g. highland and
lowland sorghums) or by maturity dates (e.g. short- and longer-term maize). Minimally, seed
traders should sort varieties by colour classes, although some traders also distinguish varieties
clearly within colour classes (e.g. within white teff, more and less drought tolerant). Trader
knowledge of varieties differs greatly by crop.
• Defined, proven sources (provenance): crops considered to have use as ‘implicit seed’
should generally be grown and sourced locally. Beyond an agro-ecological zone, generally only
more commercial crops or modern varieties (of maize, wheat, beans) are considered by traders
to have seed potential.
Issues of seed quality
• Visual appearance (physical properties): seed should look mature, not broken, not
attacked by insects/pests and discoloured seed removed. Where demanded, should seek seeds
of a specific size or shape.
• Selection before sale: remove inert matter (such as dust, sand pebbles, grain).
• Seed treatments: phostoxin (aluminum phosphide fumigant), not normally used for food.
• Germination tests: limited, but found with some traders. Also, traders should take care to
choose seed that has not started to germinate (has not had contact with moisture).
• Conditions of storage: not in underground pits for sorghum, maize, barley.
• Length of storage: one year or less, for crops such as bean and wheat.
Source: modified from Sperling et al. (2007).
varieties can differ by as much as 25–50%. Thus, in western Kenya, root rot resistant
varieties sell for about Ksh 80/kg, while the local types go for Ksh 40–60/kg (Otsyula
et al., 2004). Second, around planting time, traders may distinguish among batches
of the same variety (plant genetic material) which are ‘well sorted and stocked’ from
batches ‘less well sorted and stocked’, adding a price premium (≈5%) for the cleaner
materials, which presumably demand less labour to prepare for sowing. So sometimes
prices reflect the differences between seed and grain in terms of ‘varietal quality’, and
sometimes reflect the differences in terms of ‘seed quality’. Farmers who pay these
price premiums are undoubtedly buying seed per se.
Seed-related prices, unlike grain prices, do not rise during the hunger gap periods
(and immediately pre-harvest) so the patterns of price rise and fall are quite distinct for
seed and grain. Figure 3 conceptually suggests these price trends. The pattern below
is sketched mainly for didactic reasons: grain price trends, in particular, may be highly
variable by environment and time period.
In brief, seed and grain are distinguished in informal markets, on a routine basis.
Even if sales do not explicitly advertise and label seed separately from grain, agro-
ecological zones of acquisition, trader seed management practices and price differences
at key sowing periods accomplish, de facto, the same function.
T R A D E R S ’ S E E D / G R A I N P R A C T I C E I N E A S T E R N E T H I O P I A
This section presents a case study of trader management of seed resources in local
markets. To date, there have been very few practical analyses of how grain merchants
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Figure 3. Trends in crop and seed prices in local seed/grain markets through the season, showing seed price peaks
at sowing time and grain price peaks before harvest. Seed price differential takes into account variety quality (for
the most sought-after varieties), plus sometimes additional seed quality features (i.e. a price premium for well-sorted
stocks).
deal with seed (but see CRS and Partners, 2006; Smale et al., 2008). Given the magnitude
of farmers’ use of these markets for seed, and the enhanced role of traders in serving
vulnerable farmers and during high stress periods, this remains a serious gap. For ease
of presentation, from here on, we use the term ‘seed’ to include categories of implicit
seed, and specialized seed per se. Cases are of the latter are rarer, but we do highlight
several examples below.
To explore actual practice, grain traders in eastern Ethiopia were interviewed about
their strategy and actions. All operated in Miesso and Chiro districts of West Hararghe
Zone, where mixed farming systems produce sorghum, maize and haricot beans as
the main crops. The region is drought-prone, and many households are vulnerable
to environmental stress due to low production and weak asset ownership. In recent
years, West Hararghe has received regular emergency seed assistance, along with food
and other humanitarian aid. The main town Asebe Teferi is the commercial hub for
a vast region in eastern Ethiopia, and a secondary trade link between Addis Ababa
and eastern cities and export markets. This location is therefore useful for analysing
seed trade in stressed contexts. The trader study formed part of a larger investigation
of humanitarian aid in Ethiopia (Sperling et al., 2007).
Twenty-one traders were interviewed, evenly split between those in the Miesso
lowlands, and those in the highland ecologies of Chiro; though some worked out of
Asebe Teferi, most were based in smaller centres. The sample included large- and
medium-scale merchants (n = 9), as well as ‘collectors’ who work very locally (n = 12;
see Figure 4 below). The scale of trader commerce was assessed ‘relatively’, by traders
themselves, as these business people were reluctant to reveal the absolute scale of their
commerce. Features such as presence and size of storage facilities, number of trucks
owned or rented, and number of flour mills owned also helped to make distinctions
among trader groups.
Traders distinguish between grain and seed
All traders (n = 21) were aware of how seed differed from grain in terms of
germination ability and the need to understand provenance (and hence adaptation
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potential). However, they only occasionally managed the two clusters separately, with
distinct seed management largely linked to specific customer demands, for instance a
demand for seed suited to a specific environmental condition or output market.
Most management of seed related to post-harvest actions, such as selecting out
visibly damaged grains or inert material (pebbles, dust). All traders also kept varieties
separate to some degree (mostly sorting by colour). Those working directly with farmers
nearly always distinguished among named varieties. Even larger traders sometimes
grouped varieties by geographic origin as a proxy for adaptation zone (e.g. sorghum
from Miesso v. Jijiga). Traders who gave some effort to retaining variety identity were
particularly: those involved with export crops such as haricot beans; those selling
modern varieties (e.g. of open-pollinated maize or wheat); and those who dealt with
varieties especially adapted to harsh zones. Such attention to adaptation may reflect
the considerable agro-ecological variation in the region (Miesso and Chiro range from
1300 to 2300 m asl); simply, for some crops, highland varieties will not perform in the
lowlands.
The majority of traders (n = 16) had also had occasional experience selling seed
as a distinct product from grain, preceded with specific seed management practices,
when seed per se was demanded. Government officials sometimes contracted traders
to multiply modern varieties (maize, wheat), or highly adapted local ones (sorghum),
for seed. In normal years, seed sales were a small proportion of grain sales (traders’
estimates varied from 1 to 5%), although they reported paying farmer producers a
premium when purchasing seed specifically. For instance, a ‘collector’ buying directly
from farmers paid 5–10 Birr/100 kg extra (≈0.5–1.0 US$) for good local seed
of indigenous crops such as sorghum, roughly a 5% premium. For white haricot
beans, an export crop, traders higher up the chain reported paying 100 Birr/100 kg
(≈10 US$) more for pure, clean seed, a 33% premium.
Distinguishing among traders is key for determining seed flows
Distinguishing different levels of seed/grain trade also helped determine whether
seed-related practices varied among traders; for instance, whether collections from
different sites were mixed as stocks were amalgamated up the trading chain. Fig-
ure 4 maps the seed/grain flows in West Hararghe, as charted through trader
interviews. The mapping of flows differed by crop; while food staples (sorghum, teff,
maize) flow back to local levels for resale to farmers during the hungry season, this
generally does not happen for export crops like coffee or beans.
Several comments related to Figure 4 are in order. Collectors clearly distinguish seed
from grain. Dealing directly with farming communities (often via resident brokers),
collectors may seek out individual farmers known for producing good seed. In some
cases, they give standing orders for ‘this type of bean’, or ‘this quality of sorghum’.
With such specific demand, farmer-producers know in advance that they are producing
‘seed’ from the moment the crop is sown, and manage the crop accordingly.
Some traders also are able to respond to demands for specific materials, i.e. varieties
adapted to particular (often harsh) agro-ecological conditions. For example, the
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Figure 4. Flows of seed/grain (implicit seed) in informal market flows in West Hararghe, from Sperling et al. (2007).
non-governmental organization (NGO) CARE reported a case from Achar (a district
near Asebe Teferi) where a specific pearl millet variety (Dekuny) was in high demand
after the 2003 drought, but apparently not locally available. The local trader
provided seed from his storage houses, which had been separated and well-maintained
throughout the year. In a sense, this trader served as a community backup during
a stress period, not just for seed security (by making seed available), but also by
maintaining a key plant genetic resource.
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Further, researchers had predicted that seed-related knowledge would become less
specific, and the seed/grain distinction more poorly managed, higher up the trading
chain. This assumption proved not to apply in a well-defined number of cases. There
were very large traders (e.g. 100 t sorghum per season) who acquired their seed
only through direct contacts with hundreds of farmers, and who kept stocks separate
according to defined agro-ecological zones or varieties. One trader in Asebe Teferi
monopolized the seed/grain supply over three districts: his scale was large but fairly
uniform in terms of the varietal adaptability of the goods he put on offer. Additionally,
traders dealing with crops for urban consumption or export (e.g. haricot beans, wheat,
maize) also aimed to maintain strong standards even as volumes rose. This makes
economic sense: losses become great if large quantities of grain have to be discarded
in order to deliver a high-quality product. Such high-quality material often has better
potential for seed.
In sum, traders’ practical distinction of seed and grain varied with their place in the
supply chain (and by crop). However, surprisingly, some large traders also ‘did seed’,
and traders in highly stressed areas had basic knowledge of what types of varieties might
be adapted for sowing. In addition, when presented with specific requests for ‘seed’,
from government officials, urban dwellers or exporters, traders’ seed management
could become more refined.
Trader practice during high stress periods
Trader experience during high stress periods yielded especially valuable insight
into the seed trade. The sample of 21 traders had had long experience of regional
seed/grain commerce: between 6 and 40 years (mean 18) for medium- to large-scale
traders, and between 5 and 12 years (mean 8) for local collectors. Moreover, 10 of
the 12 collectors had long resided in adjacent farming communities, and could draw
upon 3–5 decades of first-hand observations of crop production fluctuations. All had
conducted business during normal and stressed periods, experiencing crises due to
drought, pest attack and (for a few) civil unrest.
Traders highlighted a number of trends associated with periods of stress. While
West Hararghe has received emergency seed aid since at least 1984, and nearly every
year since the mid-1990s, all traders asserted that seed for key crops had been constantly available
directly within the region or within reach of the region (suggesting that it has been unnecessary
to bring seed into the region as aid). In terms of specific signals associated with stress,
traders indicated changes in: volumes of seed supplied, price; geographic source of
seed and scale of seed loans. The first two areas are documented below to underscore
the value of further investigating seed market fluctuations.
Traders estimated buying and selling prices, as well as volumes traded, for two
seasons they could recall in detail, one ‘normal’ and one ‘crisis’. Most drew from the
previous six years, focusing on the three crops most marketed as seed. Table 3 shows
mean values reported for a normal season, which serve as a baseline for the price
and volume changes reported below. Prices for maize and sorghum seed are broadly
similar for larger traders and smaller collectors, though larger traders offer and receive
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Table 3. Mean buying and selling prices, and volumes of seed traded for key crops, as reported by medium
to large traders (large) or smaller collectors (small) in West Hararghe.
Buying price Selling price Quantity
No. (ETB) (ETB) traded (t)
Crop Large Small Large small Large Small Large Small
Maize 8 7 92.1 96.4 113.7 112.5 7.0 16.2
Sorghum 7 11 102.1 105.9 117.1 116.4 30.5 27.5
Beans 6 7 145.4 108.4 174.2 122.5 41.7 30.0
All crops 22 32 112.5 134.2 128.0 152.3 25.5 20.0
ETB: Ethiopian birr.
Table 4. Changes in buying price, selling price, and volume of seed traded in crisis seasons, in relation to prices
and volumes in a ‘normal’ seasons in West Hararghe, eastern Ethiopia, by crop and scale of merchant – medium to
large traders (large) or smaller collectors (small); differences between larger traders and local collectors significant
at p < 0.10 (∗) and p < 0.05 (∗∗).
% change between normal and crisis year
No. Buying price Selling price Quantity traded (t)
Crop Large small Large small Large Small Large Small
Maize 7 6 104.9∗ 57.4∗ 88.3 49.0 528.3∗∗ −43.3∗∗
Sorghum 7 11 91.1∗∗ 31.5∗∗ 90.2∗∗ 29.5∗∗ 279.0∗∗ −67.1∗∗
Beans 6 7 70.6∗∗ 30.3∗∗ 58.6∗∗ 27.6∗∗ 304.7∗ −58.8∗
All crops 22 32 87.3∗∗ 32.9∗∗ 79.7∗∗ 29.7∗∗ 374.5∗∗ −65.3∗∗
significantly higher prices for beans (p < 0.05, Mann-Whitney U test). This difference
reflected transport costs for the larger traders who sourced high-quality bean seed
from the Rift Valley (see Figure 2). Also striking is that mean volumes traded were
similar for both groups, suggesting that the seed trade has greater relative importance
for smaller collectors.
Volume changes in seed supplied. Table 4 shows how prices and volumes changed in
a crisis year. The responses of medium to large traders differed significantly from
collectors in most cases. Medium and larger traders increased their seed business during
periods of stress, directly in response to farmers’ demand. Several even commented
that they sell no seed at all in normal times for crops such as sorghum. The magnitude
of change was high: average volumes sold for each crop more than tripled in stressed
periods. This change was most dramatic for maize, possibly reflecting the importance
of fast-maturing maize for coping with drought.
In contrast, local collectors actually decreased the volume of seed purchased from
the surrounding farms in stress periods. These decreases were large, with volumes
dropping 65% on average in crisis years. Collectors commented that local farmers
prefer to keep the bulk of their harvests in stress years, which greatly reduces quantities
available for sale locally.
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Price fluctuations. Meaningful and reliable absolute price values would require
intensive investigation (e.g. to account for price variations between seed and grain,
or intra-seasonal fluctuations). However, within-trader comparisons provide useful
insights, indicating clear trends in relative price increases (Table 4).
Traders at all scales increased prices during stress periods, though at a significantly
higher rate further up the trader chain. While larger traders increase sales during
stress, local collectors actually have less seed to supply them, so the former must seek
supplies from further away. These interviews with larger traders suggest that transport
costs are the biggest factor affecting seed price during crisis times, not rise in the
price in the crop material per se. However, traders indicated that changes in external
demand can also cause substantial local price fluctuations, particularly for export crops
such as beans.
Expanding trader roles in crisis and normal periods
The case study from West Hararghe established the current roles of traders: during
normal times they are increasingly supplying Ethiopian farmers with some of their
seed (Dalton et al., forthcoming), and during crises they are critical seed suppliers
to farmers, as well as to government and NGOs involved in seed aid. In terms of
expanding Ethiopian traders’ roles in seed-related business, several areas of interest
were explored during the case study: interventions related to variety quality, seed
quality and the passing of seed-related information.
Farmers across Ethiopia lack access to new (modern) varieties. Official figures from
2005 show only 3–5% of area sown to improved seed, mostly wheat and maize (Byerlee
et al., 2007). Research on seed aid in dispersed regions of Ethiopia showed ‘receipt
of modern varieties’ as the major benefit farmers cite from ‘emergency assistance’
(McGuire and Sperling, 2008), even though this diffusion might better be performed
by extension or by informal market processes. Seed/grain traders in West Hararghe
currently have had only limited access to modern varieties, mostly of beans and maize
(e.g. Katumani). However, traders could be powerful partners in moving such varieties
in several ways. Distribution of variety samples (to stimulate demand), sale of small
packets of seed and more systematic sale of modern varieties in bulk are approaches
that have had marked success in other countries in East and Central Africa (P. Seward,
personal comment, May 2008; Rubyogo et al., forthcoming).
Seed/grain traders could also be partners in improving the seed quality per se.
Procedures for (inter alia) segregating among varieties and reducing percentage of
sub-standard grains could give farmer clients a better return for their purchase. Initial
quality-related interventions have had promising results in West Hararghe. Since 2002,
those supplying CARE’s relief seed programme in Asebe Teferi have been required:
to have a licence; separate out varieties; have a warehouse; and maintain specific
seed stores (which are clean and insect free). CARE also trains traders in seed quality
issues and withdraws contracts from those who deliver substandard material. Such
awareness-raising, capacity building and monetary incentives (such as CARE’s) might
be possible measures for encouraging gradual seed/grain quality improvements in
other places.
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Traders could also be key sources for disseminating variety and seed information
(e.g. which varieties are available and from where, cost, quality, performance). Traders
move even in remote communities and equipping them with up-to-date seed-related
information would raise awareness quickly among clients, but also among other
important trader suppliers. To date, the information-sharing capabilities of traders
have been little exploited, and links between traders and formal extension have been
idiosyncratic, at best.
D I S C U S S I O N A N D C O N C L U S I O N S
The informal seed/grain trade receives little attention from governments or
researchers for two clusters of reasons. The first has to do with ignorance or stereotypes
surrounding informal seed markets. Traders are commonly seen as relatively minor
sources of seed or as a hazard, foisting poor-quality material on vulnerable farmers.
Such negative portrayals rarely appear to reflect empirical assessment of local markets,
but rather express a belief in ideals of self-sufficient farmers or of efficient, modern
formal markets. The analyses of farmer and trader practice, presented within this
paper, challenge such negative assumptions about informal local markets, which,
far from a minor phenomenon, prove critically important for millions of farmers.
Informal markets are an important secondary source of seed security, especially for
the vulnerable, during stress periods or for specialized products. If trends continue,
local seed markets could become the primary source of seed in many contexts. This
analysis also shows that farmers use markets strategically and discriminately to get the
seed they want and need, and (along with some merchants) take actions to safeguard
seed and variety quality. Local markets even have a role in plant genetic resource
conservation. Thus, informal seed/grain markets merit much more attention and
support from research and development organizations.
A second cluster of reasons for the under-recognition of informal markets centres
on conceptual and methodological challenges. This paper presents several concepts
and practical aids to help tease apart the seed trade from the larger grain trade which
usually surrounds it. One important concept is the distinction between grain, implicit
seed and seed. Understanding seed flows requires better understanding of farmers’
knowledge and action in deriving seed from implicit seed (e.g. in selecting a vendor or
sorting material purchased). Some merchants also distinguish seed and grain through
separate management practices. This paper suggests aids for analysing seed flows,
showing how price data can help identify seed demand, agro-ecological seed maps
clarify seed acquisition strategies, and trader classification hierarchies show distinct
roles and seed flow patterns for actors at different scales. These concepts and aids can
be sharpened through further empirical study focusing on actual practices of farmers
and traders.
One key situation for further empirical work might be during periods of crisis or
chronic stress, when markets supply much more seed than in normal times. Markets
help safeguard farmers’ seed security, and also help them tailor crops and variety
portfolios to changing environmental conditions. Additionally, the poorest farmers
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tend to use markets more, across all types of seasons. Thus, informal markets are
important for vulnerable farmers, and their role deserves more consideration from
those involved in social protection or humanitarian aid. However, there are also
non-vulnerable situations where the informal seed trade is increasing, as traders and
farmers identify roles or market niches that are not being fully exploited by more formal
markets. These may include dissemination of new varieties, provision of specialized
products (e.g. varieties with specific adaptations or desirable traits), maintenance of
valued crop genetic resources in a region or risk-transfer around seed quality. These
situations highlight how informal seed markets are also highly relevant for agricultural
development and even biodiversity utilization and conservation.
There is much untapped potential for public action to work with traders as a
positive force. Whether the goals relate to agricultural development, supporting
vulnerable farmers or maintaining key genetic resources, conceptual shifts are needed
to make the informal seed trade more visible. Analytical aids and more detailed
indicators (such as market prices) will be important, as will better understanding of how
different market actors preserve, and even enhance, the value of seed. Partnerships
between traders and formal-sector actors show much potential here: for example,
by disseminating new varieties through small seed packets, or by helping traders to
improve their seed management practices. As these markets by definition operate
outside of formal regulation, mechanisms for quality control are clearly important.
Formal sector organizations can promote their own incentives for this, though it
is likely that multi-faceted social relationships among buyers and sellers will remain
important for building trust and confidence around seed transactions, as seen in weakly
regulated market relationships more broadly. There is clearly potential in harnessing
the informal seed trade to provide important benefits to farmers. However, this can
only happen in a systematic way when there is more appreciation, and a fuller analysis,
of how these informal markets function.
Acknowledgements. For the Ethiopian work, the authors gratefully acknowledge the
support of Aberra Deressa the Ethiopian Minister of Agriculture, and Solomon Assefa
and Tsedeke Abate of the Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research. Research team
members involved in the market surveys included: Teshale Assefa, Berhanu Amsalu,
Belete Dagne, Kassaye Negash and Yealembirhan Molla. CARE personnel Hailu
Merga and Kiros Tsegaye also offered key and gracious assistance in linking with
traders in Asebe Teferi. The International Development Research Centre and US
Agency for International Development funded this research, with Wardie Leppan,
Laura Powers, Julie March and Eric Witte offering valuable support.
R E F E R E N C E S
Aw-Hassan, A., Mazid, A. and Salahieh, H. (2008). The role of informal farmer-to-farmer seed distribution in diffusion
of new barley varieties in Syria. Experimental Agriculture 44: 413–431.
Badstue, L. B., Bellon, M. R., Berthaud, J., Jua´rez, X., Manual Rosas, I., Solano, A. M. and Ramı´rez, A. (2006).
Examining the role of collective action in an informal seed system: a case study from the Central Valleys of Oaxaca,
Mexico. Human Ecology 34: 249–273.
136 L O U I S E S P E R L I N G A N D S H AW N M C G U I R E
Bellon, M. R. (2004). Conceptualizing interventions to support on-farm genetic resource conservation. World
Development 32: 159–172.
Byerlee, D., Spielman, D. J., Alemu, D. and Gautam, M. (2007). Policies to promote cereal intensification in Ethiopia:
a review of evidence and experience. IFPRI Discussion Paper No. 707.
CIAT (1991). Comparisons of seed quality, from bean seed obtained from range of formal and informal sources. In
Annual Report Bean Program, 1991, 310–312. Cali: CIAT.
Cooper, D. (1993). Plant genetic diversity and small farmers: Issues and options for IFAD. Staff Working Paper No. 13.
Rome: International Fund for Agricultural Development.
Cromwell, E. (1996). Governments, Farmers and Seeds in a Changing Africa. Wallingford, UK: CABI.
CRS and Partners. (2006). Seed system security assessment (SSSA) Douentza, northern Mali. Bamako: CRS/Mali.
Final Report.
Dalton, Timothy, J., Lipper, L. and Cavatassi, R. (2010). Seed systems, household welfare and crop genetic
diversity in three woredas of Ethiopia: household and plot-level descriptive statistics, ESA working paper.
http://www.fao.org/economic/esa/seed2d/outputs5/it.
David, S. and Sperling, L. (1999). Improving technology delivery mechanisms: lessons from bean seed systems research
in Eastern and Central Africa. Agriculture and Human Values 16: 381–388.
FEWS Net. (2009). Nigeria Food security update USAID and Famine Early Warning System. Available online at:
www.fews.net/docs/Publications/Nigeria_fsu_May%202009.pdf [Accessed 29 December 2009].
Lipper, L., Anderson, L. and Dalton, T. J. (eds.). (2009). Seed Trade in Rural Markets: Implications for crop diversity and
agricultural development. London: Earthscan.
Longley, C., Jones, R., Ahmed, M. H. and Audi, P. (2001). Supporting local seed systems in southern Somalia: A
developmental approach to agricultural rehabilitation in emergency situations. AgREN Paper No. 115. London:
ODI.
McGuire, S. J. (2007). Vulnerability in farmer seed systems: Farmer practices for coping with seed insecurity for
sorghum in Eastern Ethiopia. Economic Botany 61: 211–222.
McGuire, S. J. (2008). Securing access to seed: Social relations and sorghum seed exchange in eastern Ethiopia. Human
Ecology 36: 217–229.
McGuire, S. J. and Sperling, L. (2008). Leveraging farmers’ strategies for coping with stress: seed aid in Ethiopia.
Global Environmental Change 18: 679–688.
Ndjeunga, J. (2002). Local village seed systems and pearl millet seed quality in Niger. Experimental Agriculture 38:
149–162.
Otsyula, R., Rachier, G., Ambitsi, N. R. J., Ndiya, C., Buruchara, R. and Sperling, L. (2004). The use of informal
seed producer groups for diffusing root rot resistant varieties during period of acute stress. In Addressing Seed Security
in Disaster Response: Linking relief with development, 69–89 (Eds. L. Sperling, T. Remington, J. Haugen and S. Nagoda).
Cali: CIAT.
Republic of Kenya. (2005). Draft National Seed Policy. Nairobi: Ministry of Agriculture. Available online at:
www.ecabren.org/pdfs/nationalseedpolicy2005.pdf [Accessed 29 December 2009].
Rubyogo, J. C., Sperling, L., Muthoni, R. and Buruchara, R. (forthcoming). Bean seed delivery for small farmers in
Sub-Saharan Africa: the power of partnerships. Society and Natural Resources.
Smale, M., Diakite´, L., Dembe´le´, B., Traore´, I. S., Guindo, O. and Konta, B. (2008). Trading millet and sorghum
genetic resources: women vendors in the village fairs of San and Douentza, Mali. IFPRI Discussion Paper No. 746.
IFRPI: Washington, DC.
Sperling, L. (1994). Summary Report. Analysis of bean seed channels in the Great Lakes Region: South Kivu, Zaire,
Southern Rwanda, and select bean-growing zones of Burundi. Butare, CIAT African Occasional Publications series
No. 13. Rwanda: CIAT/RESAPAC.
Sperling, L. (1997). War and crop diversity. AgREN Paper No. 75. London: ODI.
Sperling, L. (2002). Emergency seed aid in Kenya. Some case study insights from lessons learned. Disasters 26: 329–342.
Sperling, L., Scheidegger, U. and Buruchara, R. (1996). Designing seed systems with small farmers: principles derived
from bean research in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. AgREN Paper No. 60. London: ODI.
Sperling, L., Deressa, A., Assefa, S., Assefa, T., McGuire, S. J., Amsalu, B., Negusse, G., Asfaw, A., Mulugeta, W.,
Dagne, B., Hailemariam, G., Tenaye, A., Teferra, B., Anchala, C., Admassu, H., Tsehaye, H., Geta, E., Dauro,
D. and Molla, Y. (2007). Long-term seed aid in Ethiopia: Past, present and future perspectives. Final Project
Report prepared for IDRC and USAID-OFDA. Addis Ababa and Rome: EIAR, CIAT and ODG. Available online at:
http://flar.org/webciat/africa/pdf/long_term_seed_aid_Eth07_full.pdf [Accessed 29 December 2009].
